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CURRENT DECISIONS

Federal Interpleader-AvAiLABiLiTY

OF INTERPLEADER TO LIABIL-

ITY INSURER BEFORE CLAIMS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO JUDGMENTS.

In Underwritersat Lloyd's v. Nichols,' the insured, an Arkansas crop

duster, damaged the crops of about eighteen Arkansas farmers with the
aggregate damage totaling more than twice the liability policy coverage.
After two farmers had begun actions against the insured in Arkansas
courts for damages exceeding policy coverage, but before any judgments had been rendered, the British insurer brought this interpleader
action in a federal district court to compel litigation of all claims against
the insured in a single action, and to enjoin further prosecution of the
two pending state court cases. The insurer stakeholder argued that if
interpleader were not allowed it would "perhaps" be subject to liability
greater than the insurance policy coverage because, after paying initial
successful claimants and exhausting policy funds, the court might find
they should have prorated the available funds among the claimants.
Arkansas had no direct action statute; therefore, the claimant farmers
and the insured argued that the stakeholder was in no immediate danger
of facing multiple liability so as to make federal interpleader relief available.2 The court allowed the interpleader action.
The problem with which the court was confronted in this case was
that of construing paragraph 1 of Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,3 which allows interpleader if plaintiff "may be exposed" 4
to multiple liability. The court reasoned that this phrase gave federal
courts interpleader jurisdiction here because the stakeholder was in actual danger of facing multiple suits. The opposite view would be that
state law must determine whether or not a stakeholder may be exposed
to multiple liability; therefore, where the state does not have a direct
1. 363 F. 2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966).
2. There are two possibilities of obtaining federal interpleader relief. Statutory interpleader, embodied in Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1948), is available if the
controversy exceeds $500 and there are two or more claimants of diverse citizenship.
Rule 22 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows interpleader if there is complete
diversity of citizenship between the stakeholder on one hand and all claimants on the
other with more than $10,000 in controversy. Here, interpleader under Rule 22 is in
issue because there is no diversity between claimants. The court points out, however,
that the Interpleader Act and Rule 22 are so similar in construction that it is irrelevant
which is used when deciding if the insurer can interplead an unliquidated claim.
8. Rule 22 provides: "(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined
as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is
or may be exposed to double or multiple liability:'
4. The counterpart phrase in 28 U.S.C. § 1335 is that interpleader can be obtained
if two or more claimants, "may claim" to be entitled to benefits of any policy, see
also supra note 2.
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action statute, a stakeholder would not be in danger of facing multiple
suits.0
The view that federal interpleader is not available to an insurer when
the adverse tort claims against insurer are unliquidated originated with
Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Co.' in 1934 and has been followed several
times in recent years.7 Practical reasons for such a view are that, where
federal interpleader is allowed, the federal courts oust state court jurisdiction over a local matter and the insurer is thereby allowed to evade
any contractual obligation it might have to defend claims against the
insured.8 The opposite view, which was accepted by the court here,
dates from articles written by Professor Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., interpreting the Federal Interpleader Act of 193 6. This view was given sup-

port by Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 10 which was decided under a state direct action statute, and has been followed in recent
5. Tashire v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 363 F. 2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966). Here,
insured had a collision with a bus. The potential claims against insured exceeded the
liability policy coverage. There was no direct action statute available to claimants and
the insurance policy contained a "no action" clause. There was diversity between
insured and claimants so this case was decided under statutory interpleader, see also
notes 2 and 4 supra. The court held that interpleader was not available to insurer
since, under state law, the claimants "may not claim" to be entitled to benefits of any
policy.
6. 69 F. 2d 934 (8th Cir. 1934). In Klaber the court refused to allow an interpleader
proceeding arising out of an automobile accident, although the potential claims exceeded the limits of the policy. In the case at bar the court discredited Klaber as a
precedent, by pointing out that it was decided under the 1926 Interpleader Act which
did not contain a "may claim" clause.
7. Accord, National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 230 F. Supp.
617 (N.D. Ohio, 1964); Tashire v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 363 F. 2d 7
(9th Cir. 1966).
8. See American Indemnity Co. v. Hale, 71 F. Supp. 529, 531-532 (W.D. Mo. 1947),
where these reasons for the rule are most aptly stated.
9. See 45 YAIm L. J. 1161, 1163-67 (1936); 49 YALE L. J. 377, 420 (1940). Although
Professor Chaffee advocated that foreign insurers be allowed to interplead in federal
courts before claims against the insured became liquidated, this was part of a larger
plan, and the rest of the plan was not adopted by the court in the case at bar. According to Professor Chaffee's interpretation of the interpleader act, the claimant
should not be enjoined from suing the insured at law before a jury, but enforcement
of judgments resulting therefrom. against the insurer should be enjoined. The resulting
judgments would be filed in equity until the date set for distribution, at which time
the judgment creditors would be paid pro rata. In the case at bar the claimants were
enjoined from suing at law before a jury. Had Professor Chaffee's plan been accepted
in toto all obligations listed above to allowing federal interpleader would have been
eliminated.
10. 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960). There is a conflict whether the direct action
statute was a critical factor in this case. In the case at bar the court argued that it
was not.

1967]

CURRENT DECISIONS

years.'- These authorities reason that the Federal Interpleader Act and
Rule 22 12were designed to protect stakeholders from multiple liability
and the expense of multiple litigation, and it should be liberally construed to accomplish this. Such a construction of federal interpleader
also provides equal treatment of claimants. Thus, one claimant could
not fortuitously get the first judgment and exhaust the fund.
The conflict between the two above views appears to be complete. On
the very same day this decision was rendered by the eighth circuit,
the ninth circuit issued a decision with the opposite result. 3 The equities
appear equal and both statutory constructions are reasonable. The possibility exists that, rather than rejecting either view, the courts will
eventually compromise along the lines suggested by Professor Chaffee. 14
F. PrinceButler

Taxation-DEDuCTioN OF AroRNEY's FEES. In Parker v. Commis-

sioner,' petitioner was the "prime functionary" of a religious organization known as the foundation for Divine Meditation (F.D.M.). He
claimed the right to exclude from his income legal fees paid by F.D.M.
for his defense in a criminal prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and for fees used in bringing a civil suit for slander
against those charging him with this crime. Relying on Conmissionerv.
Tellier,2 the Court of Appeals refused to uphold the Tax Court and dell. Accord, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S. D. Ind. 1964).
12. See supra note 2.
13. Tashire v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 363 F. 2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966). See
note 5 supra.
14. See supra note 9.
1. 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1966). The court also found that the foundation for Divine
Meditation (F.D.M.) did not qualify under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code
as a tax-exempt organization based on religious purposes. Generally, where there are
profit-making ventures, the Internal Revenue Service will look beyond the purposes
of the organization to the substance of its transactions and tax the organization where
such profits appear excessive. Accord: Marcella v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 878 (8th Cit.
1955); Saint Germain Foundation v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 648 (1956); Scripture Press
Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
2. 383 U.S. 687 (1966). Held that where attorney's fees were paid in defending a
criminal action arising out of one's trade or business, the expenses could be deducted in
spite of the fact that taxpayer was convicted of the crime.

